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Abstract
Financial intermediation is a value-enhancing service. Banks are among the 
most important financial institutions in a modern economy for that service. 
Conventional banks use rates of interest (charged to clients and paid to depositors) 
on both the assets and the liabilities sides. Since interest is prohibited in Islam, 
Islamic financial experts have developed a number of financial instruments that 
avoid any involvement in interest. They take the form of either risk-and-reward 
sharing or trading in commodities/assets to price assets. In this paper we describe 
the basic features of the most important among these financial instruments. Even 
though Islamic banks emerged in response to market needs of Muslim clients, 
they are not religious institutions. Like other banks, these are profit seeking 
institutions, simply following a different model of financial intermediation. 
While it is the preferred way of banking for one fifth of humanity, it offers a 
wider choice of financial products to all by generating a number of benefits for 
the society. The successful operation of Islamic financial institutions has proven 
that this new model of financial intermediation is not only viable, but in many 
aspects, it is rather superior to the conventional model. The appealing features of 
the Islamic model have attracted world-wide attention. Islamic financial industry 
which started as a niche market in early 1970s in the Middle East has made a 
place for it in more than fifty countries around the globe and has grown into a 
multi-trillion dollars industry. This paper attempts to explain the basic features 
of this fascinating model.
Key Words: Financial intermediation, Islamic finance, Islamic financial 
products
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1. Introduction
In any economy, there is a need to transfer funds from savers to investors because 
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exploit the profitable investment opportunities, i.e., they are not entrepreneurs. 
This function is performed either directly through stock and bond markets or 
through the process of financial intermediation in the financial markets.  Since 
interest is prohibited in Islam, a different model of financial intermediation 
was proposed in 1950s which envisaged providing modern financial services 
without dealing in interest. At that time, it was considered wishful thinking 
since interest was deeply entrenched in almost all financial dealings. However, 
serious research work over the next two decades proved that Islamic banking 
is not only feasible and viable; it is an efficient and productive way of financial 
intermediation. In response, several Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
emerged under heterogeneous social and economic milieu. What started as a 
small rural banking experiment in the remote villages of Egypt in early 1960s 
has now reached a level where many mega international banks are offering 
Islamic banking products. And several Western countries, following a lead from 
the UK, have made room for Islamic financial products/institutions in their legal 
structures. 
The most important operators in the financial markets are commercial 
banks. Since the passage of the so-called Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, commercial 
banks’ securities activities and affiliations between commercial banks and 
securities firms were prohibited. However, the market largely ignored the 
provisions of Glass-Steagall Act and they gradually faded away. They were 
formally repealed in 1999 through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. With the 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, commercial banks, investment banks, 
securities firms, and insurance companies were allowed to consolidate. Since 
then commercial banks are also one of the biggest players in stock and bond 
markets. 
Financial intermediation enhances the efficiency of the saving/
investment process by eliminating many mismatches inherent in the needs of 
surplus and deficit units of an economy (Iqbal & Llewellyn, 2002). The surplus 
units are often small households who save relatively small amounts and the deficit 
units are the firms who often need relatively large amounts of cash. Financial 
intermediaries remove this size mismatch by collecting the small savings and 
packaging these to make them suitable to the needs of the users. In addition, 
users of funds in general need funds for relatively long-term deployment, which 
cannot be met by individual suppliers of funds. 
This creates the mismatch in the maturity and liquidity preferences of 
individual savers and users of funds. The intermediaries resolve the conflict again 
by pooling the small funds. Moreover, the risk preferences of small suppliers and 
large users of funds are also different. It is often considered that small savers are 
risk averse and prefer safer placements whereas the fund users may deploy funds 
in risky projects. Therefore, the funds cannot be directly supplied. The role of 
the intermediaries again becomes crucial. They can substantially reduce this risk 
through portfolio diversification. Furthermore, small savers cannot efficiently 
gather information about investment opportunities. Financial intermediaries are 
International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
Islamic Finance: An Attractice New Way of Financial Intermediation: 1-24 3
in a much better position to collect such information, which is crucial for making 
the investment successful.
The role and functions of banks outlined above are indeed highly 
useful and socially desirable, but interest plays a central role in each of these 
functions. Islamic financial intermediation endeavors to replace interest by 
partnership between owners of capital and human resources (entrepreneurs) on 
the basis of risk/profit sharing as a basic form of co-operation between capital 
and entrepreneur. Trading activities are also an integral component of Islamic 
banking.
2. Basic Principles of Islamic Finance
In Islamic jurisprudence there are two kinds of Rulings (arkām). The first ruling 
is called ibādāt (worshipping) which governs the relationship between a man 
and his God. The general principal in case of ibādāt is that nothing is permitted 
unless endorsed by authentic and explicit analogical permission by the Law 
Giver. In other words, an act is considered worship only if so ordained. The 
second ruling is of arkām, called muʿāmalāt (mutual dealings) which governs 
the relationship among mankind. In this case, the general principal is that of 
permissibility (ibādah) i.e., everything is permitted unless clearly prohibited by 
the Law Giver. The collection of Rulings comprises of what is called as Sharī’ah 
(Islamic law). 
Since we are discussing the second set of Rulings, the general rule is 
that of permissibility. We call this the “Doctrine of Universal Permissibility”. 
The Doctrine permits the contracting parties to agree on any conditions as long 
as they do not violate any Sharī’ah ruling. This is supported by a well-known 
authentic hadīth which states:
 “All conditions mutually agreed upon by the Muslims 
are upheld, except any condition that would allow what is 
prohibited or prohibit what is lawful.” [Sunan Tirmidhi:1352]
This principle gives a very wide scope in designing contracts. However, the 
qualification, “unless clearly prohibited by Sharī’ah” must never be ignored. 
When one looks at the permissible acts and contracts and the non-permissible 
ones, one is struck with the very wide scope of running human relations within 
the boundaries of Sharī’ah in all fields of life including financial transactions. 
There are very few kinds of activities that are prohibited. Furthermore, when 
we reflect even on these prohibitions, one can easily ascertain that the purpose 
of such prohibitions is to provide a level playing field to protect the interests of 
weaker parties; to ensure justice and fairness; to ensure mutual benefit for the 
parties as well as the society at large; minimize chances of conflicts and promote 
social harmony. Islamic law is so beneficent that it not only ensures protection 
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of interests of the two parties to the contract, it also protects the interests of third 
parties, future generation and even the en
The prohibitions are very few. In the following paragraphs we discuss 
those prohibitions that are most relevant for constructing financial contracts.
2.1  Prohibition of Ribā 
Islam prohibits all forms of ribā. But what does this term encompass? The word 
ribā as a noun literally means in Arabic, an increase, and as a root, it means the 
process of increasing. Ribā has been understood throughout Muslim history as 
being equivalent to interest paid on a loan. The prohibition of ribā essentially 
implies that the fixing in advance of a positive return on a loan as a reward 
for waiting is not permitted by the Sharī’ah. It makes no difference whether 
the return is big or small, fixed or variable or an absolute amount to be paid in 
advance or on maturity, or a gift or service to be received as a condition for the 
loan. It also makes no difference whether the loan was taken for consumption or 
business purposes. In its basic meaning ribā can be defined as “anything (big or 
small), pecuniary or non-pecuniary, in excess of the principal in a loan that must 
be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the principal as a condition,1 
(stipulated or by custom), of the loan or for an extension in its maturity.” 
As mentioned in the definition of ribā given above, anything, big or 
small, stipulated in the contract of loan to be paid in addition to the principal is 
ribā. Such additional payment in modern terminology is known as interest. Thus 
ribā and interest are the same. The equivalence of ribā and interest has always 
been unanimously recognized in Muslim history by all schools of thought. While 
the basic rationale for the prohibition/condemnation of ribā is moral, it creates 
many economic problems too. The ease of availability of credit on interest also 
creates inherent instability in the financial system. As Nobel laureate Maurice 
Allais (1993) rightly points out: 
“The world economy as a whole rests today on gigantic 
pyramids of debts, buttressed one against another in a fragile 
equilibrium. Never in the past had such a colossal accumulation 
of promises to pay been witnessed. Undoubtedly, never will it 
be so difficult to master. Be it speculation on currencies or 
speculation on stocks and shares, the world has become one 
big casino with gaming tables distributed along every latitude 
and longitude. The game and the bids, in which millions of 
players take part, never cease.” 
Iqbal (2013) dwells on the dangers and consequences of unreasonable ease of 
access to credit and the resulting debt overhang which has caused havoc with 
global economy several times, the most recent example being the still raging 
1 Thus any excess given by the debtor out of his own accord, and without the existence of a custom 
or habit that obliges him to give such excess is not considered as ribā.
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European debt crisis. Several other recent publications show that the root cause 
of these crises is excessive debt facilitated by interest-based contracts (Reinhart, 
Carmen & Rogoff, 2009). It is pertinent to note here that the practice of interest 
has been condemned by many most prominent thinkers in human history and 
by all Devine religions. Mills and Presley (1999) have traced the history of 
prohibition of interest in Biblical texts.  
The basic rationale for the prohibition of interest is based on ethics, most 
importantly to ensure justice to all parties. In many cases, charging of interest 
is also demeaning. For example, if the loan is for procuring things necessary 
for survival, charging interest delivers a severe blow to the very basic fabrics of 
social life which requires cooperation, care and help of the needy, and protecting 
the weaker members of the society. 
2.2  Prohibition of Gharar
Prophet (pbuh)2 prohibited any trading activity involving ‘gharar’. In 
jurisprudential literature, gharar has been variously defined. Mainly there are 
three views which are summarized by al-Darir (1997). First, gharar applies to 
cases of uncertainty, as in the case of not knowing whether something will take 
place or not. A second view holds that gharar applies trading of unknown. Thus, 
according to Ibn Hazm gharar in sales occurs when the purchaser does not know 
what he has bought and the seller does not know what he has sold. Third is 
a combination of the two opinions; gharar covers both the unknown and the 
doubtful, as exemplified by the definition proposed by Al-Sarakhsi which states 
that gharar obtains where consequences of a contract are not known. This is the 
view favoured by most jurists. 
Gharar has been one of the most difficult Islamic juristic terms to explain 
to non-specialist. Some authors have dealt with it very comprehensively in long 
treaties.3   Perhaps the best way to envision its true scope and import is to list 
some examples. 
In modern contracts, gharar appear in many ways. The most important 
categories are the following: 
i) Ignorance of the genus. For example, saying “I sell you 1 kilogram of 
apples for five dollars.” It involves gharar because it is not clear what 
type of apples are the subject of sale.
ii) Ignorance of the species. For example, saying “I sell you my pet for 100 
dollars.” It is not known what the pet is.
iii) Ignorance of the attributes. For example, saying “I sell you my car for 
5000 dollars.” It is not known which car. (However, if the object is 
available and offered for inspection with known defects declared then 
there is no gharar.)
iv) Ignorance of the quantity of the object. For example, saying “I sell you 
a box of oranges for 20 dollars” without mentioning the type of oranges 
2  Short form for “May peace of Allah be upon the soul of Prophet Muhammad”
3  The best reference, in view of this author is Darir al-Siddiq (2012)
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and the weight. Branding and standardization can remove this type of 
gharar.
v) Ignorance about price. For example, saying “I sell you this dress for a 
week’s salary.”
vi) Ignorance of the specific identity of the object. For example, saying “I sell 
you one flat in this building for fifty thousand dollars.” Mentioning of flat 
number and allowing physical inspection is necessary.
vii) Ignorance of the time of payment in deferred sales. For example, saying 
“I buy this house from you for 100,000 dollars which I will pay when my 
farm is sold.”
viii) Inability/uncertainty to deliver the object. For example, saying “I sell 
you the bird sitting on that tree,” or “I sell you my BMW which has been 
stolen if it is recovered for only $1000.”
ix) Contracting on a non-existent object. For example, saying “I sell you the 
harvest of my farm from the next crop.”
x) Not being able to inspect the object. For example, saying “I sell you the 
contents of this carton for fifty dollars on as is basis.”
xi) More than one option in a contract unless one is specifically chosen. For 
example saying “You can either take my car for ten thousand dollars,” 
or “My boat for fifteen thousand dollars.” The sale would become valid 
only after you exercise your option and specifically choose what you are 
buying.
xii) Contingent Sale. “I sell you my house for $25000, if Peter rented his 
house to me.”
These examples are not exhaustive but they should be sufficient in giving 
a fairly good idea of what the prohibition of gharar implies. In essence, gharar 
refers to acts and conditions in exchange contracts, the full implications of 
which are not clearly known to the parties. This is something very similar to 
‘asymmetric information’. Lack of knowledge with respect to all implications 
of a contract vitiates against the principle of voluntary consent of all parties 
which is a necessary condition in all contracts of exchange according to Islamic 
law. In other words, had the parties known the full implications of the contract, 
one (or both) of them may have preferred not to enter into that contract. In 
the presence of asymmetric information, the agreement of the parties cannot 
be considered as voluntary consent. The objective of prohibition of gharar is 
to minimize possibilities of post-facto misunderstandings and conflicts between 
the contracting parties. As such, any conditions in contracts that may give rise 
to ambiguities and/or misinterpretations and are preventable must be avoided.
Jurists make a distinction between two types of gharar: gharar fāḥish 
(substantial) and gharar yaseer (trivial). The first type is prohibited while the 
second is ‘tolerated’ since this may be unavoidable without causing considerable 
damage to one of the parties with the possibility of post-facto conflict. In many 
cases, it is simply not possible to reveal all information; not because the seller 
wants to hide anything, but because it is in the nature of the subject matter. The 
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buyer has to trust the seller. For example, the buyer of a built house has to take 
the word of the seller as to what kind of material is used in the foundations of the 
house. The seller obviously cannot dismantle the house to reveal the foundations 
to the buyer. His intention is not to hide essential information, but the nature 
of the subject matter of the contract is such that he cannot show it to the buyer. 
Therefore, such lack of knowledge does not violate contracts. The principle in 
such cases is that the seller must act as a trustworthy person. Penalties may be 
imposed ex-post if it is proved otherwise.
In the literature, some other prohibited types of trade or conditions therein 
are also mentioned. For example, the following cases are mentioned: prohibition 
of selling something not owned; ghish (cheating, for example adulteration); two 
mutually inconsistent contracts with (conditions) bunched into one contract; 
ikrāh (coercion); ghaban (fraud); But on closer examination one finds that these 
are covered by the prohibition of gharar. 
In economic parlance the term is very close to “Asymmetric Information.” 
Its prohibition necessitates ‘full disclosure’ by all parties of a contract. Any 
intentional concealment renders the contract void. Small, unintentional or 
unavoidable lack of disclosure (gharar yaseer) is tolerated (not to be considered 
allowed). Post contract exposure is still subject to legal recourse for compensation.
2.3 Prohibition of Gambling
Gambling involves transfer of wealth without any value added. It is zero-sum 
game and does not make any addition to the national wealth. Prohibition of 
gambling implies prohibition of all zero-sum games and taking risks that are 
self-created. As compared to this, taking risk which are normally involved 
in almost all business activities do not come under the purview of gambling. 
Islamic financial contracts encourage sharing of these risks among the parties.
2.4  Loan and trade contracts cannot be combined 
This is prohibited by an authentic hadith. The rationale for this prohibition can 
easily be seen. If allowed, a lender may advance the loan on an interest-free basis 
in the loan part of the deal but they can buy something at a cheaper price in the 
sale part of the deal which amounts to ribā.
2.5  Two deals cannot be combined into one
The Prophet (pbuh) prohibited “two deals in one”. Some scholars take this hadith 
as a general prohibition of combining contracts. However, actually it implies 
that if more than one option is offered, one must be chosen before the deal is 
finalised. For example, if a seller offers a product for sale such as: (i) $1000 
on cash payment basis; (ii) $1100 on payment after six months; (iii) $1500 on 
payment after one year etc., the buyer must choose one of the options and close 
the deal. The rationale of such prohibition is that it amounts to gharar which, as 
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stated above, is prohibited in business contracts. The seller will not know when 
(and hence how much money) he will receive.
2.6  Right to profit is contingent upon taking responsibility (for loss)
This is in line with the principle of justice to all parties. In the field of financial 
contracts, any condition which gives a party assured benefit without him taking 
any risk is not allowed. For example, in an interest-based loan contract the lender’s 
capital is guaranteed, yet he gets a positive return. All risk of loss is borne by the 
borrower. That is not allowed. As compared to this, in a muḍārabah contract, if 
a loss occurs the financier bears the monetary loss and the entrepreneurs loses 
any return for his efforts.  In other words, the capitalist loses part of the money 
capital and the entrepreneur loses ‘sweat capital’. Thus both parties share profit 
in case of profit and loss in case of loss. 
3. Islamic Banking and Finance: A Different  
Way of Financial Intermediation
Islam fully recognizes the useful role that financial intermediation can play 
value. Historically, the role of a financial intermediary in the Islamic economy 
is found in the principle of al-muḍārib udārib; a practice which has existed 
in Islamic history since early centuries. It can be expressed as, “the one who 
mobilizes funds, on profit-sharing basis, can extend these funds to the users on 
the same basis”. Similarly, in leasing, the lessee who possesses the usufruct, 
may sell these against a higher price (rent), and create additional value. In the 
early Islamic period, most caravan trades were financed by muḍārabah (trust 
financing) and money transfer was quite common among businessmen. Islamic 
scholars consider the earning of profits from an intermediary role as a genuine 
occupation. It is however, noticeable that such financial intermediation is 
interwoven with the production and exchange of real goods and services. 
The functions of Islamic banks and other financial intermediaries are 
similar to their conventional counter-parts. Islamic finance experts have shown 
that there are alternative Islamic modes and models through which these functions 
can be performed. In fact, they have shown that Islamic models can perform 
these functions in a better way. An Islamic bank, like other banks, is a company 
whose main business is to mobilize funds from savers and supply these funds 
to businessmen/entrepreneurs. It is organized as a joint stock company with the 
shareholders supplying the initial capital. While a conventional bank uses the 
rate of interest for both obtaining funds from savers and supplying these funds to 
businessmen, an Islamic bank performs these functions using various financial 
modes compatible with the Sharī’ah. These will be described later in the paper. 
First we would like to present the most basic features of Islamic finance.
While Islamic banks perform mostly the same functions as conventional 
banks, they do this in distinctly different manners. Some of the distinguishing 
features of Islamic banking are given below:
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3.1 Risk Sharing
The most important feature of Islamic banking is that it promotes risk-sharing 
between the provider of funds (investor) and the user of funds (entrepreneur). 
By contrast, under conventional banking, the investor is assured a predetermined 
rate of interest. Since the nature of this world is uncertain, the results of any 
project are not known with certainty ex-ante. Therefore, there is always some 
risk involved. In conventional banking, all this risk is borne by the entrepreneur. 
Whether the project succeeds and produces a profit or fails and produces a loss, 
the owner of capital gets away with a predetermined return.4 In Islam, this kind 
of unjust distribution is not allowed. In Islamic banking both the investor and the 
entrepreneur share the results of the project in an equitable way. In the case of 
profit, both share this in pre-agreed proportions. In the case of loss, all financial 
loss is borne by the capitalist and the entrepreneur loses his labour. Askari, Iqbal, 
Krichene and Mirakhor (2012) discuss in detail on what benefits risk/profit 
sharing model of financial intermediation brings to an economy.
3.2 Emphasis on Productivity Relative to Credit Worthiness
Under conventional banking, almost all that matters to a bank is that its loan 
and the interest thereupon are paid on time. Therefore, in granting loans, the 
dominant consideration is the credit-worthiness of the borrower and/or his 
providing sufficient collateral as a cover. Under Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) 
banking, the bank will receive a return only if the project succeeds and produces 
a profit. Therefore, an Islamic bank will be more concerned with the soundness 
of the project and the business acumen and managerial competence of the 
entrepreneur. This feature has important implications for the distribution of 
credit as well as the stability of the system. Chapra (2000) lists the limitations/
harms of a collateral-based banking.
3.3 Moral Dimension
Conventional banking is secular in its orientation. In contrast, in the Islamic 
system all economic agents have to work within the moral value system of 
Islam. Islamic banks are no exception. As such, they cannot finance any project 
which conflicts with the moral value system of Islam. For example, they will 
not finance a wine factory, a casino, a night club or any other activity which is 
prohibited by Islam or is known to be harmful to society. In this respect Islamic 
banks are somewhat similar to “Ethical Funds” which are now becoming popular 
in the Western world. 
4  Except in the extreme case of bankruptcy.
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3.4   Close linkages between monetary and real sectors
In Islamic model of financial intermediation, there is a close link between the 
monetary and real sectors of the economy. The financial products are either 
asset-backed or trade-linked. In this way ‘pure’ speculation is eliminated. This 
feature provides a safeguard against forming of artificial economic bubbles that 
often lead to economic and financial instability
3.5 Wider Set of Products
An important point to be noted in the way Islamic banking works is that it 
offers a wider choice of products. In addition to some fixed-return modes that 
can serve necessarily the same functions that interest serves in conventional 
banking, Islamic banks can use a variety of innovative profit-sharing financing 
techniques. The addition of various profit-sharing modes, which can be designed 
to meet the needs of different classes of risk-takers, to the menu of available 
financial products, renders several advantages, which will be noted later in the 
paper.
 
4. Islamic Financial Products
In this section we briefly explain the most commonly used financial products 
being used by Islamic financial institutions and lately by corporations and 
governments.
4.1 Mushārakah (Partnership)
Mushārakah literally means sharing. In the Islamic finance literature it refers 
to a joint enterprise in which all the partners share the profit or loss of the joint 
venture. The financial term is derived from the Islamic legal term “shirkah” 
with the same literal meaning but having a broader application. In the Islamic 
fiqh literature shirkah is of two kinds: The first is shirkat-ul-milk which means 
joint ownership of two or more persons of a particular property/asset which may 
come into existence either through inheritance or joint purchase. The second 
kind of shrikah is shirkat-ul-ʿaqd, which means a partnership established 
through a contract. Such contractual partnerships are usually established for 
commercial purposes and take several forms such as partnership in the capital 
of the enterprise, partnership in labour and management, common goodwill or a 
combination of these elements. 
Mushārakah as a financial contract refers to an arrangement where two 
or more parties establish a joint commercial enterprise and all contribute capital 
as well as labour and management as a general rule. The profit of the enterprise 
is shared among the partners in agreed proportions while the loss will have to be 
shared in strict proportion of capital contributions. The basic rules governing the 
mushārakah contract include:
ʿ
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i) Profit of the enterprise can be distributed in any proportion by mutual 
consent. However, it is not permissible to fix a lump sum profit for 
anyone.
ii) In case of loss, it has to be shared strictly in proportion to the capital 
contributions.
iii) As a general rule all partners contribute both capital and management. 
However, it is possible for any partner to be exempted from contributing 
labour/management. In that case, the share of profit of the sleeping 
partner has to be in strict proportion of his capital contribution.
iv) The liability of all the partners is unlimited.
As a mode of finance, an Islamic bank can advance money to a client 
using the contract of mushārakah. Normally the bank will use the option of 
being a sleeping partner. The contract can be more widely used by Islamic funds 
whereby the unit holders can assume the role of sleeping partners. The contract 
can also be used in securitized assets.
4.2  Mudārabah (Passive Partnership)
Mudārabah is a special type of partnership. This is a contract between two 
parties: 5 a capital owner (called rabb al-māl) and an investment manager (called 
mudārib). Profit is distributed between the two parties in accordance with the 
ratio that they agree upon at the time of the contract. Financial loss is borne by 
the capital owner; the loss to the manager being the opportunity cost of his own 
labour, which fails to generate any income. Except in the case of a violation of 
the agreement or default, the investment manager does not guarantee either the 
capital extended to him or any profit generation. Some other important features 
of the mudārabah contract include:
i) While the provider of capital can impose certain mutually agreed 
conditions on the manager, he has no right to interfere in the day-to-day 
work of the manager.
ii) Mudārabah is one of the fiduciary contracts. Mudārib is expected to act 
with utmost honesty, otherwise he is considered to have committed a grave 
sin (in addition to worldly penalties). This has important implications for 
the moral hazard problem.
iii) The liability of the rabb al-māl is limited to the extent of his contribution 
to the capital. 
iv) The muḍārib is not allowed to commit the mudārabah business for any 
sum greater than the capital contributed by the rabb al-māl.
v) All normal expenses related to mudārabah business, but not the personal 
expenses of the mudārib, can be charged to the mudārabah account6.
5 There could be more than two parties. The contract is explained using a two-party example only 
for simplicity.
6 However, in case of travelling outside the place of business, the muḍārib is entitled to travel and 
living expenses during the trip.
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vi) The contract of mudārabah can be terminated at any time by either 
of the two parties on giving a reasonable notice. (This condition may 
create serious problems in the context of modern commercial enterprises. 
However, in the light of the ‘Doctrine of Universal Permissibility’ 
mentioned above, the parties can agree on any conditions in the contract 
that will regulate the termination so as not to cause any damage to the 
enterprise).
vii) No profit distribution can take place (except as an ad hoc arrangement, 
and subject to final settlement), unless all liabilities have been settled and 
the equity of the rabb al-māl restored.
As a mode of finance applied by Islamic banks, on the liabilities side, 
the depositors serve as rabb al-māl and the bank as the mudarib. Mudārabah 
deposits can be either general, which enter into a common pool, or restricted to a 
certain project or line of business. On the assets side, the bank serves as the rabb 
al-māl and the businessman as the mudārib (manager). However the manager 
is often allowed to mix the mudārabah capital with his own funds. In this case 
profit may be distributed in accordance with any ratio agreed upon between the 
two parties, but the loss must be borne in proportion to the capital provided by 
each of them.
4.3  Diminishing Partnership
This is a contract between a financier (e.g., a bank) and a beneficiary in which 
the two agree to enter into a partnership to own an asset, as described above, but 
on the condition that the financier will gradually sell his share to the beneficiary 
at an agreed price and in accordance with an agreed schedule.
4.4 Bay al- murābahah (Sales Contract at a Profit Mark-up)
In the classical fiqh literature, there is a sales contract called bay al-mu’ajjal 
which refers to sale of goods or property against deferred payment (either in 
lump sum or instalments). Bay al-mu’ajjal need not have any reference to the 
profit margin that the supplier may earn. Its essential element that distinguishes 
it from cash sales is that the payment is deferred. Strictly speaking, the deferred 
payment can be higher than, equal to or lower than the cash price. 
There is another sale contract known as bay al-murābaḥah, which 
refers to a sale in which the seller declares his actual cost and the parties agree 
on adding a specific profit margin. Basically, this is a two party buying and 
selling contract. No financial intermediation is involved. The Islamic banks have 
created a mode of finance by combining the concepts of bay al-mu’ajjal and 
bay al-murābahah. They use this contract as a mode of finance in the following 
manner. 
The client orders an Islamic bank to purchase for him a certain 
commodity at a specific cash price, promising to purchase such commodity 
from the bank once it has been bought, but at a deferred price, which includes 
an agreed upon profit margin called mark-up in favour of the bank. Thus, the 
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transaction involves an order accompanied by a promise to purchase and two 
sales contracts. The first contract is concluded between the Islamic bank and 
the supplier of the commodity. The second is concluded between the bank and 
the client who placed the order, after the bank has possessed the commodity, 
but at a deferred price, that includes a mark-up. The deferred price may be paid 
as a lump sum or in instalments. In the contract between the Islamic bank and 
the supplier, the bank often appoints the person placing the order (the ultimate 
purchaser) as its agent to receive the goods purchased by the bank. The basic 
rules governing the murābahah contract include:
i) The subject of sale must exist at the time of sale.
ii) The subject of sale must be in the ownership of the seller at the time of 
sale.
iii) The subject of sale must be in the physical or constructive possession of 
the seller.
iv) The delivery of the sold commodity to the buyer must be certain and 
should not depend on a contingency or chance.
v) As in any sales contract the price must be specified and once specified it 
cannot be increased in case of default.
vi) The time of delivery must be specified.
vii) The payments schedule must be specified.
4.5  Ijārah (Leasing)
In the simple lease contract the usufruct generated over time by an asset, such as 
machinery, airplanes, ships or trains is sold to the lessee at a predetermined price. 
This is called an operating lease, as opposed to a financial lease. The operating 
lease has a number of features that distinguish it from other forms of leasing. 
Firstly, the lessor is himself the real owner of the leased asset and, therefore, 
bears all the risks and responsibilities of ownership. All defects, which prevent 
the use of the equipment by the lessee, are his responsibility, even though it 
is possible to make the lessee responsible for the day-to-day maintenance and 
normal repairs of the leased asset. Secondly, the lease is not for the entire useful 
life of the leased asset but rather for a specified short-term period (for a month, a 
quarter, or a year) unless renewed by mutual consent of both the parties.
 
4.6  Ijārah wa iqtina’ (Lease Ending in the Purchase of the Leased Asset)
Since the entire risk is borne by the lessor in the operating lease, there is a danger 
of misuse of the leased asset by the lessee. The financial lease helps taking care 
of this problem by making the lease period long enough (usually the entire useful 
life of the leased asset), to enable the lessor to amortize the cost of the asset with 
profit. At the end of the lease period the lessee has the option to purchase the 
asset from the lessor at its market value at that time. The lease is not cancellable 
before the expiry of the lease period without the consent of both the parties. 
There is, therefore, little danger of misuse of the asset.
Iqbal: Islamic finance
14                    The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 10. Number 2, August  2013: 1-24
A financial lease has other advantages too. The leased asset serves as 
a security and, in case of default on the part of the lessee, the lessor can take 
possession of the equipment without court order. It also helps reduce the lessor’s 
tax liability due to the high depreciation allowances generally allowed by tax 
laws in many countries. The lessor can also sell the equipment during the lease 
period such that the lease payments accrue to the new buyer7. This enables the 
lessor to get cash when he needs liquidity. This is not possible in the case of a 
debt because, while the Sharī’ah allows the sale of physical assets, it does not 
allow the sale of monetary debts except at their nominal value.
Some of the jurists have expressed doubts about the permissibility of 
financial leases. The rationale they give is that the long-term and non-cancellable 
nature of the lease contract shifts the entire risk to the lessee, particularly if 
the ‘residual’ value of the asset is also fixed in advance. The end result for the 
lessee may turn out to be worse than the outright purchase of the asset through 
an interest-bearing loan. A financial lease has thus the potential of becoming 
more exploitative than outright purchase. Suppose the lease contract is for five 
years. The lessee would have to continue making lease payments even if he does 
not need the asset, say, after two years. In the case of a purchase through an 
interest-bearing loan, the purchaser can sell the asset in the market and repay the 
loan, thus reducing his loss. This cannot be done in a financial lease. If a party 
is unable to make lease payments, it may lose its stake in the asset even though 
part payment of the asset price has been made beyond the rental charge he would 
normally pay in an operating lease.
However, there are jurists who consider financial leases to be permissible 
if certain conditions are satisfied. Firstly, the lessor must bear the risks of 
leasing by being the real owner of the leased asset. The lessor cannot lease 
what he does not own and possess, and should be responsible for all the risks 
and responsibilities related to ownership. Therefore, a leasing contract where 
the lessor acts only as an intermediary between the supplier and the lessee and 
plays the role of only a financier, with ownership of the asset being nothing 
more than a legal device to provide security for repayment of the loan and legal 
protection in case of default, is not allowed. In this case the lessor leases an 
asset before buying and taking possession and gets a reward without bearing any 
risk. Secondly, lease payments cannot start until the lessee has actually received 
possession of the leased asset and can continue only as long as it remains usable 
by him. Thirdly, all manufacturing defects and later damages which are beyond 
the control of the lessee, should be the lessor’s responsibility8. The lessee can, 
however, be made responsible for the proper upkeep and maintenance of the 
leased asset. 
As a form of financing used by Islamic banks in practice, the contract 
takes the form of an order by a client to the bank, requesting the bank to purchase 
a piece of equipment, promising, at the same time, to lease it from the bank after 
7 The new buyer has to agree to continue the lease on the conditions previously agreed unless the 
lessee willingly agrees to new conditions.
8 Some of these can be insured against, but this has to be done by the lessor at his own cost.
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it has been purchased. Rent instalments are calculated in such a manner as to 
include, in reality, recovery of the cost of the asset plus the desired profit margin. 
Thus, this mode of financing includes a purchase order, a promise to lease, and 
a leasing contract with a provision to transfer ownership of the leased asset to 
the lessee at the end of the lease agreement. This transfer of ownership is made 
through a new contract, in which the leased asset is either given to the lessee 
as a gift or is sold to him at a nominal price at the end of the lease agreement. 
According to a decision of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, this second 
transfer-of-ownership contract should be signed only after termination of the 
lease term, on the basis of an advance promise to affect such a transfer of 
ownership to the lessee. 
4.7  Bay al- Salam
Bay al-Salam (usually written in short form as salam) is a sales contract in which 
the price is paid in advance at the time of contracting, against delivery of the 
purchased goods/services at a specified future date. Not every commodity is 
suitable for a salam contract. It is usually applied only to fungible commodities. 
Some basic rules governing the salam sale are given below:
i) The price should be paid in full at the time of the contract.
ii) Goods whose quality or quantity cannot be determined by specification 
cannot be sold through the contract of salam. An example is precious 
stones.
iii) Goods can be sold only by specifying the attributes. They cannot be 
particularized to a given farm, factory or area.
iv) The exact date and place of delivery must also be specified.
Islamic banks can provide financing by way of a salam contract 
by entering into two separate salam contracts, or one salam contract and an 
instalments sale contract. For example, the bank could buy a commodity by 
making an advance payment to the supplier and fixing the date of delivery as the 
date desired by its client. It can then sell the commodity to a third party either 
on a salam or instalments sale basis. If the two were salam contracts, the second 
contract would be for delivery of the same quantity, description, etc., as that 
constituting the subject-matter of the first salam contract. This second contract 
is often concluded after the first contract, as its price has to be paid immediately 
upon conclusion of the contract. To be valid from the Sharī’ah point of view, the 
second contract must be independent, i.e., not linked to the delivery in the first 
contract. Should the second contract consist of an instalments sale, its date should 
be subsequent to the date on which the bank would receive the commodity.
4.8  Bay al-istisnah (Contract to Manufacture) and Bay al- istisnah al-Tamwilī 
(Financing by Way of istisnah )
Bay al-istisna (usually written in short form as istisna) is a contract in which a 
party orders another to manufacture and provide a commodity, the description of 
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which, delivery date, price and payment date are all set in the contract. Any party 
can cancel the contract after giving a notice to the other before the manufacturing 
work starts. However, after the manufacturing work has started, the contract 
cannot be cancelled unilaterally. 
Istisna is similar to salam in the sense that both are exceptions to some 
general conditions of sale which prohibit selling of something which is not 
owned and is not in the possession of the seller at the time of sale. However, 
there are some differences between the two which are summarized below:
i) The subject of istisnah is always a thing which needs manufacturing, while 
salam can also be effected on things that do not involve manufacturing.
ii) In the case of salam full payment of price is necessary whereas in case of 
istisnah the payment can be delayed.
iii) The time of delivery in case of salam must be specified at the time of the 
contract. In the case of istisnah this is not necessary.
Al-istisnah al-tamwilī, which is used by Islamic banks, consists of two 
separate istisnah contracts. The first is concluded between the beneficiary and the 
bank, in which the price is payable by the purchaser in future, in agreed instalments 
and the bank undertakes to deliver the requested manufactured commodity at an 
agreed time. The second istisnah contract is a subcontract concluded between 
the bank and a contractor to manufacture the product according to prescribed 
specifications. The bank would normally pay the price in advance or during 
the manufacturing process in instalments. The latter undertakes to deliver the 
product to the bank on the date prescribed in the contract, which is the same date 
as that stated in the first istisnah contract. The original purchaser (i.e., the bank’s 
client) may be authorized to receive the manufactured commodity directly from 
the manufacturer.
4.9  Wakālah (Agentship)
Wakālah is a contract whereby someone appoints another to act in/pursue some 
matter on his behalf. It is permissible to charge a fee for providing such services. 
In Islamic finance, the contract is being used extensively in the area of Fund 
Management. Under this contract, an Islamic bank serves as an investment 
manager for some clients. Usually the bank establishes a Mutual Fund in which 
clients buy units. The Fund promoter (Bank) is the wakīl (agent) of the unit 
holders and charges a fixed fee for its services. The profit or loss is passed on to 
the Fund providers after deducting Bank’s fees. It is worth noting that mutual 
funds are different from mudārabah accounts in the Islamic banks. The basic 
difference between the two is that in the latter case the bank is mudārib and 
hence shares in the risk of investment. In case of investment funds, all risk (loss) 
is borne by the unit holders. For the same reason, the Fund promoters have 
no share in profits, all of which after deducting fixed management fees of the 
promoters, is passed on to the unit holders.
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4.10  Tawarruq
In many cases the clients would need liquidity which cannot be linked to 
purchase of commodities. Conventional financial system has the capability of 
providing cash for those who want it, provided they are willing to give back 
more than they borrow and are able to provide a collateral or guarantee. Islamic 
financial system does not have this facility. Recently, some banks have started 
using a new instrument called tawarruq.
In the classic fiqh literature there is an instrument called tawarruq for 
obtaining cash in case of difficulties facing an individual. It works like this. 
Suppose A asks B for a loan. B says that I do not have any cash but I can lend 
you one bushel of wheat. A takes that loan in kind, sells it in the market and 
gets the cash that he needed. At the time of repayment, A goes to the market 
buys a bushel of wheat of the same quality and returns it to A. In essence, this 
is an arrangement of loan in kind. Since one of the conditions of loan is that the 
ownership must be transferred to the borrower, he can do whatever he wants with 
the borrowed commodity. Thus his selling it for cash is legitimate. Since what 
he returns after the period of the loan is exactly the quantity borrowed, there is 
no question of ribā in this kind of deal. Hence, the arrangement is permissible.
However, the way this instrument is being practiced by banks is a lot 
more different. It appears to be simply a ‘devious artifice’ (ilah) to go around 
prohibition of interest through an intermediate process, the end result being what 
was prohibited. Say, A goes to the bank for obtaining cash on loan. On the 
request of the client, the bank buys, at a credit price, on client’s behalf some 
commodities on paper. In order to do that A signs a wakālah contract appointing 
the bank as his agent for this purchase. Bank certifies that it has done so at, say 
a credit price of $1.0 million due after one year. A becomes owner of these 
commodities. He now signs another wakālah contract, this time appointing the 
bank as his agent to sell those commodities. Bank certifies that it has done so at 
a cash price of $900,000 and pays this amount to A. All of these transactions are 
only on paper. It can easily be seen that it is money obtained now ($900,000) 
for more money to be paid later ($1.0 million). The real asset involved in the 
process is no more than a dummy. A single piece of real asset can form the basis 
of innumerable successive tawarruq deals.
There are a few scholars who have allowed tawwaruq argued on the 
basis of the example given above in the classic fiqh literature. However, one 
can easily see that the two are far apart. Therefore, even those scholars place 
some restrictions to be complied with, if this instrument is to be declared 
Sharī’ah-compatible. Basically, they require the banks to actually buy and take 
at least constructive possession of the commodities involved and then sell them. 
According to my information almost all of the banks using this instrument are 
not complying with those conditions. Hence, I believe that it is only a subterfuge 
for a ribā transaction. 
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4.11  Bay al-Dayn (Sale of debt)
Many Islamic instruments, the most prominent example being bay al-murābahah, 
give rise to debt obligations. Can such debt be sold at a discount in order to 
obtain immediate cash? According to a majority of Islamic scholars, sale of 
debt is not permissible except at face value. The traditional Muslim jurists are 
unanimous on the point that sale of debt is possible only on its face value. 9 
Discounting debt is not allowed in Sharī’ah. The overwhelming majority of the 
contemporary Muslim scholars are of the same view. However, some scholars of 
Malaysia have allowed selling debt at a discounted price. They refer to a ruling 
of Shafaī school wherein it is held that the sale of debt is allowed. They did not 
pay attention to the fact that the Shafaī jurists have allowed it only in a case 
where the debt is sold at its par value.
In fact, the prohibition of bay al-dayn is a logical consequence of 
the prohibition of ribā. A ‘debt’ receivable in monetary terms corresponds to 
money, and every transaction where money is exchanged for the same type of 
money, the exchange must be at par value. Any increase or decrease from one 
side is tantamount to ribā. Some scholars argue that the permissibility of bay-
al-dayn is restricted to a case where the debt is created through the sale of a 
commodity. In this case, they say, the debt represents the sold commodity and its 
sale may be taken as the sale of a commodity. Such an argument is not correct. 
For, once the commodity is sold, its ownership is passed on to the purchaser 
and it is no longer owned by the seller. What the seller owns is nothing other 
than money due. Therefore, if he sells the debt, it is no more than the sale of 
money and it cannot be termed as the sale of the commodity. That is why this 
view has not been accepted by the overwhelming majority of the contemporary 
scholars. The International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Jeddah, which is the largest 
representative body of Sharī’ah scholars and has the representation of all the 
Muslim countries, including Malaysia, has unanimously upheld the prohibition 
of bay al-dayn at a discount.10
4.12 Ju ālah
Ju ālah is a contract whereby one party (offerer) undertakes to pay a prescribed 
fee to the second party (offeree) for performing a given task. For example A 
may offer to B that if you build this wall, I will pay you $100. The contract of 
Ju ālah could have a useful role in the area of issuing of letters of guarantee by 
Islamic banks. However, the classical fiqh literature is almost unanimous to the 
point that the guarantee is a charitable transaction and no fee can be charged 
on a guarantee. The most the guarantor can do is to claim his actual secretarial 
expenses incurred in offering the guarantee. Usmani (2004, pp.130-131) notes 
that some contemporary scholars are considering the problem from a different 
angle. They feel that guarantee has become a necessity, especially in international 
9  See Usmani (2004), p.217.
10  See the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, Resolution No. 101 (4/11), 1998.
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d)trade where the sellers and the buyers do not know each other, and the payment 
of the price by the purchaser cannot be simultaneous with the supply of the 
goods. There has to be an intermediary who can guarantee the payment. It is 
utterly difficult to find the guarantors who can provide this service free of charge 
in required numbers. Keeping these realities in view, some Sharī’ah scholars of 
our time say that the prohibition of guarantee fee is not based on any specific 
injunction of the Holy Quran or the Sunnah of the Prophet. It has been deduced 
from the prohibition of ribā as one of its ancillary consequences. Moreover, 
guarantees in the past were of simple nature. In today’s commercial activities, the 
guarantor has to bear some costs for giving the guarantee. Therefore, they opine, 
that the prohibition of guarantee fee should be reviewed in this perspective. In 
practice, Islamic banks are using this contract for providing letters of credit and 
letters of guarantee to their clients.
4.13  Sukūk
Sakk (singular of Sukūk) literally means cheque or promissory note for receivable. 
Technically Sukūk refer to financial instruments meant to mobilize resources 
from the market based on the strength of one’s balance sheet, credentials, track 
record, goodwill and prospects of the proposed project. They are meant to 
provide an Islamic alternative to conventional bonds. Sukūk can play a positive 
role in mobilization of savings on a vast scale. They benefit investors as well as 
those who have projects to finance that bear the promise of eventually generating 
sufficient revenue to meet the costs yet leave a surplus. Their proliferation 
increases the efficiency of the financial system. Also, they are capable of meeting 
credit needs of government and businesses in a manner that keeps credit supply 
linked with real assets.
Financial engineers have come up with fancy, names for various types11 
where ‘engineering’ is more in names than in substance. The basic ideas are 
quite simple. Sukūk are basically, certificates based on ownership of certain 
assets. Generally, these certificates are negotiable in secondary markets. They 
represent ‘ownership’ in the assets underlying the issue. Those with variable 
returns are based on mudārabah or mushārakah. There are also Sukūk with pre-
determined, fixed income streams. The most popular of these is the one based on 
ijārah, (lease). There are Sukūk based on salam or istisnah contracts. Also there 
are hybrid issues whose underlying assets are mixtures of these. Murābahah 
receivables being debt obligations are not considered fit for Sukūk issue. But 
they have been accepted in such a mixture as long as they are in a minority. Due 
to this last point, while Sukūk offer a usefully potential mechanism for secondary 
market resource mobilization, they also open the way for sale of debt receivables 
(as minority share in a general Sukūk issue). Since, the sale of debt except at its 
face value is not generally acceptable by Islamic jurists, the use of Sukūk where 
debt receivable are a noticeable proportion, remain suspect from a Sharī’ah point 
of view.  
11 For various types of Sukūk in vogue, please see the paper of Meysam Safari in this issue.
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As Ariff (2012) points out, Sukūk have several advantages over 
conventional bonds, for which ṣ ukūk provide an alternative. These include:
•	 First, large firms with a sure profit track are not afraid of sharing part 
of their profits with long term Sukūk investors. These investors will 
not sell off at the first signs of bad news because of the enshrined 
risk-sharing design of contracts. These fundamental differences in the 
contract structures lead to a new capital market product called the Sukūk 
certificate, which was first issued for public trading in 2000.
•	 Second, while there is transfer of assets to lenders, the assets are going 
to be returned to the borrower once debt is repaid, a strong incentive to 
limit debt.
•	 Third, because these investors want to avoid dealing in usury and 
interests (so it becomes an Islamic finance product), they are known to 
hold on to their security until maturity much more than would common 
bond investors.
Studies also show that, over its 12-year history, the yield is higher by 
a margin of about 10-40 basis points in low risk cases (government debt) and 
about 110 basis points in high risk cases (corporate debt). Profit sharing is only 
slightly more expensive than a one-sided contract that requires a no-default 
coupon payment with no regard to the outcome of investments!
5.   Combination of Products in One Contract
Most modern contracts are hybrid contracts in which more than one product and/
or their basic terms and conditions, are incorporated. It is, therefore, important 
to explain the rules governing such combinations. As standalone contracts, each 
component may be permissible but the combination as a whole may have the 
end result similar to a prohibited contract. In Islamic law, it is not only the words 
of the contracts that are important. The spirit of the law must be reflected in the 
end result. Many Qurãnic verses and Ahādīth heap disdain on attempts to avoid 
the spirit of the law through subterfuges or going around the bush. In general the 
following principles should be observed in designing any contract structure to 
be Sharī’ah-compliant.
5.1 The Combination Must Not Contradict an Explicit Text
If there is an explicit text in the primary sources of Islamic law that certain types 
of contracts cannot be combined, for whatever reason, then any structure that 
involves such a combination becomes unacceptable. If analysed, the rationale of 
prohibition can also be found. Some examples are:
i) It is prohibited to combine a loan contract with a sales contract. Rationale: 
If allowed, a lender may advance the loan on an interest-free basis in the 
loan part of the deal but they can buy something at a cheaper price in the 
sale part of the deal which amounts to ribā.
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ii) The Prophet prohibited “two deals in one”. Some scholars take this hādīth 
as a general prohibition of combining contracts. However, actually it 
implies that if more than one option is offered, one must be chosen before 
the deal is finalised. Rationale: Such combination amounts to gharar in 
the combined contract, which is prohibited in business contracts.   
5.2 Not Trying to Go Around the Bush
A product structured on the basis of a combination of contracts should not be 
intended to circumvent impermissible transactions. Such attempts are called ḥ iyal 
(legal artifices) and are not generally allowed. For example, the Prophet (pbuh) 
prohibited bay ʿ al-inah, which is a sale and buy-back arrangement. For example, 
A sells his house to B for a cash price of US$500,000 and simultaneously buys it 
back from B at a credit price of US$600,000. It is easy to see that the end result 
is exchange of $500,000 now for US$600,000 later. This is nothing but ribā. The 
“selling” and “buying back” of the house is inconsequential. The recent ‘Sukūk 
debacle’ was a result of similar commitment. 
5.3 The Combination Must Not Involve Contradictory Contracts/Conditions
Each type of contract has unique legal implications and obligations. Contracts 
which are mutually contradictory cannot be combined. If the legal consequences 
do not conflict each other then there is no problem in combining them. For 
example, a collateral condition supports a loan contract and is hence acceptable. 
On the other hand, a condition in a marriage contract stipulating that the spouses 
will live apart, defeats the purpose of the contract and is hence not acceptable.
5.4  The Combination Must Not Involve Contingent Contracts
The Prophet (pbuh) has prohibited a sale that is circumscribed with a condition 
(bay wa shar). If the combination is such that the execution of one contract 
is contingent upon another contract, such combination is not permissible. For 
example, William saying to Peter that I sell my house to you provided Nancy 
rents her house to me. 
6.   Summary and Conclusions
Even though Islamic banks emerged in response to the market needs of Muslim 
clients, they are not religious institutions. Like other banks, they are profit 
seeking institutions. While it is the preferred way of banking for one fifth of 
humanity, it offers a wider choice of financial products to all. Several potential 
benefits can arise from the emergence of Islamic banking. These include:
i) The range of contracts available to savers and entrepreneurs is widened. 
The menu ranges from low risk trade-linked products to high risk-
sharing contracts.
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ii) The financial system is enriched by the establishment of financial 
institutions with different modus operandi. This diversity enhances the 
stability of the financial system because the behavioral characteristics of 
different types of banks are likely to vary.
iii) Competition among alternative banking models is expected to increase 
the efficiency of the financial system.
iv) The financial needs of Muslims can be met in accordance with their faith. 
Since the public’s acceptance of the services provided by the industry 
play a vital role in creating stable and efficient markets, plurality and 
inclusiveness are important for the development of financial markets.
v) The allocation of financial resources on the basis of profit-and-loss 
sharing (PLS) gives maximum weight to the profitability of investment 
as compared with credit worthiness in the conventional system. Such 
allocation of resources is expected to be more efficient than that on the 
basis of interest.
vi) As a result of PLS contracts, the liabilities side of the balance sheet tends 
to become symmetrical with the assets side. This helps making Islamic 
banks less vulnerable to external shocks and insolvency. 
vii) The liability to share bank losses by investment depositors motivates 
them to be more vigilant about the operations of their banks and to 
demand greater transparency and more effective audit. Banks are also 
under pressure to evaluate their clients’ projects more carefully and to 
monitor the risks more effectively. 
viii) Since in the case of both profit-sharing and sale-based contracts, bank 
assets are created in response to investment opportunities in the real 
sector of the economy, and all financing is linked to commodities or 
assets, the real factors related to the production of goods and services 
(rather than speculative maneuvers) become the prime determinants of 
the rates of return.
ix) Debt creation in Islamic finance is generally not possible without the 
backing of goods and services. Monetary expansion would thus tend to 
take place in step with the growth of the real economy. This is expected 
to control inflationary pressures. 
x) Destabilizing speculation would also be significantly curtailed as would 
the erratic and mass movement of short-term funds. That will provide a 
formidable protection against economic and financial instability.
xi) The Islamic alternative for interest-based bonds, ṣukūk, is a potent 
financial product that can meet the needs of the corporate and government 
sectors, but ensuring that their debts do not become unsustainable.
xii) Like ‘Ethical Funds’, Islamic banks do not provide finance to projects 
considered socially undesirable. That introduces greater social 
responsibility.
In brief, Islamic banking should contribute to greater allocative 
efficiency, market discipline, financial stability and social responsibility. In a 
world beset with financial crises, these strengths inherent in Islamic banking 
ṣ
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should offer a new ray of hope for achieving the cherished goal of systemic 
stability. 
The experience of the last 50 years has shown that Islamic banking 
is a viable, dependable and well-supervised activity. It is just another way of 
performing the financial intermediation function. Islamic banks are subject to 
the same regulatory standards and fall under the purview of the same supervisory 
authorities as conventional banks. In addition they have to comply with the 
Islamic rules which mean that their overall legal and supervisory environment 
is more stringent. In brief, Islamic banking adds a healthy dimension to the 
international financial system.
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